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8.1 Introduction
Environmental policy is traditionally based on two sets of tools:
(1) command and control regulations; and (2) economic or market instru-
ments, such as environmental taxes, emissions charges, and tradable per-
mits. The two sets of instruments have been adopted in subsequent waves,
partly in response to economic analysis that shows command and control
environmental policies are not cost-eﬀective or are incapable of achieving
the desired objectives in many circumstances.
In the last few years, some policymakers, the business community, and
the media have increasingly emphasized the role of information-based
environmental instruments. Such instruments, which are typically volun-
tary, range from company environmental reports to environmental audit
and management schemes, such as International Standards Organization
(ISO) 14000, Eco Management Audit Scheme (EMAS), and related award
and compensation systems.
Information-based environmental policies are the subject of a lively de-
bate. Their supporters claim that environmental reports and environmen-
tal management schemes are fundamental instruments for achieving the
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251desired environmental quality. Their critics claim they are only “green-
washing,” basically ineﬀective and devoid of any real eﬀect.
This paper tries to shed some light on companies’ behavioral responses
to information-based environmental policies, dwelling on two building
blocks: an original database at the company level collected by Fondazione
Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) since 1995, and some recent literature on in-
formation and incentive schemes in companies.
This paper is divided into seven sections. Sections 8.2 and 8.3 brieﬂy de-
scribe the main information-based environmental management tools and
recall the theoretical rationale for their adoption; section 8.4 describes the
database and identiﬁes a subset of homogeneous companies in three pol-
luting industries: (1) oil and gas, (2) petrochemicals, and (3) power genera-
tion. Sections 8.5 and 8.6 present some empirical results on the relation
between information-based environmental strategies, economic perfor-
mance, and environmental performance at the company level. Section 8.7
contains some concluding remarks.
The paper presents preliminary work that needs reﬁnement. Informa-
tion-based environmental policies are still in their infancy and their history
is too recent to allow for a sound econometric analysis. The existing data
and the relevant theory, however, seem to support the hypothesis that in-
formation-based environmental policies are indeed an instrument for
changing company behavior and implementing environmental policies
and regulations.
8.2 The Theoretical Background
In the textbook institutional setting, governments set environmental
standards and companies comply. In addition to this, companies try to
follow sound environmental strategies in order to avoid litigation and the
emergence of future environmental liabilities. In some industries, such a
strategy may also establish a good environmental reputation, which can
be a powerful tool in their relationship with consumers, communities, and
environmentalists. In the two latter cases, far-sighted companies may even
exceed environmental standards.
In the situation we have just described, information plays a crucial role.
In a world with imperfect information, regulators, investors, consumers,
and other stakeholders want to know the companies’ environmental per-
formance, the achieved results, and the remaining problems and the sched-
ule to solve them. Companies, symmetrically, need to communicate their
environmental strategy and performance, in order to deal with their share-
holders, stakeholders, and regulators. Against this background, the com-
munication aimed at the external stakeholders has been widely discussed
in the recent literature (Musu and Siniscalco 1993; Tietenberg 1997; La-
noi, Laplant, and Roy 1997; Khanna and Damon 1999; McIntosh et al.
252 D. Siniscalco, S. Borghini, M. Fantini, and F. Ranghieri1998). The same ﬂow of environmental information, moreover, can play a
key role in reshaping company behavior, and this is the focus of our paper.
A useful starting point can be found in two papers, Brehn and Hamilton
(1996) and Pfaﬀ and Sanchirico (1999), which claim that the lack of inter-
nal information (i.e., ignorance) is often responsible for the noncompliance
with environmental regulation by big companies and for their wrong as-
sessment of environmental damage, hence, the need for information tools
and self-audit. The issue, however, is more complex than this.
For many years, companies (as well as regulators and the general public)
have somewhat neglected environmental issues, concentrating their eﬀorts
on economic and ﬁnancial performance. But neglecting environmental
standards, particularly in the traditional industries, has gradually created
hidden liabilities that can seriously harm shareholders’ value through vari-
ous channels: trials and litigation about health, safety, and pollution; loss
of reputation with clients and consumers; conﬂict with local communities
and environmental groups; and so forth. Such new issues, which are well
known to shareholders and companies’ chief executive oﬃcers, require a
change in company behavior that can be pursued using an information-
based environmental strategy that aims at changing company behavior
through appropriate ﬂows of information, audit, and incentives (Sinclair-
Desgagne ´ and Gabel 1997; Pendergast 1999).
Given the nature and the objectives of information-based environmental
strategies, governments and regulators too have a clear interest in promot-
ing their standardization and wide adoption, sometimes proposing guide-
lines themselves to deﬁne such schemes and make them mandatory. In
such cases, we can refer to information-based environmental policies.
8.3 Some Information-Based Environmental Management Tools
The best-known environmental management tool adopted by ﬁrms is
the corporate environmental report (CER) published annually by compa-
nies to audit and communicate the most relevant environmental issues re-
lated to their operations (emissions, eﬄuents, wastes, and expenditure and
investment in the environmental area).
The number of companies publishing environmental reports has been
rapidly growing from 1992 to 1998 (ﬁg. 8.1). Data show that the release of
environmental information, which actually began in 1990, was started by
ﬁrms in highly polluting industries, such as chemicals and oil and gas.
But environmental reporting quickly spread to other industries such as the
automotive and transportation industries, telecommunications, electronic
appliances, ﬁnancial services, and consumer goods.
As previously mentioned, the quality of published environmental re-
ports can vary substantially across companies and time. The earlier reports
typically included many statements and very few data, typically referring
Environmental Information and Company Behavior 253to hot spots in the company operations, while recent reports include most
comprehensive environmental data, together with environmental indica-
tors and analyses that usually cover all the companies’ activities.
In order to conduct a quality analysis, a speciﬁc rating system has been
deﬁned by FEEM within the Environmental Reporting Monitor (ERM)
and published regularly since 1997 (see appendix C). If we adopt such
system we can easily see that the quality of environmental reports has been
constantly increasing (ﬁg. 8.2).
FollowingthepublicationofCERsinthemid-1990s,companiesbeganto
introduce more sophisticated environmental audit systems aimed at pro-
moting continuous improvements in the environmental performance of
their operations. In order to facilitate and standardize the implementation
of such audit systems, in 1993 the European Commission adopted the
EMAS regulation. This scheme recommends voluntary participation by
companiesandgivesthemguidelines,withtheobjectiveofpromotingbetter
environmental performance at the site level. Similarly, worldwide the Inter-
national Standards Organization launched the ISO 14000 scheme for the
certiﬁcationofcorporateenvironmentalmanagement1atthecompanylevel.
Since the mid-1990s, the number of companies that certify their environ-
mental management systems for EMAS and ISO 14000 has been con-
stantly increasing. Since 1996, the year of the publication of the ﬁrst ﬁve
ISO 14000 standards, 10,439 companies have been certiﬁed. Since 1993,
more than 2,790 sites have been certiﬁed for EMAS. A similar growth can
be seen in our sample (ﬁg. 8.3).
In addition to CERs and auditing schemes, other management tools,
such as compensation programs and award schemes, have been gradually
introduced by many big companies in order to link environmental perfor-
mance to economic incentives. In this respect, the adoption of award and
compensation programs related to environmental results can be viewed as
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Fig. 8.1 Number of companies producing CERs worldwide, 1992–98
Source: ERM (1999).
1. It should be remembered that the ﬁrst national standard on environmental management
was the BS 7750, developed in the United Kingdom in the early 1990s.an incentive-compatible strategy for integrating environmental issues into
the company’s management. Compensation and award schemes quickly
spread and now they are common practice for almost all big companies.
In our sample, the percentage of companies that implemented a compen-
sation program increased from 32 percent to 73 percent from 1994 to 1997
(ﬁg. 8.4).
From the theoretical point of view, environmental reports, audit
schemes, and compensation mechanisms can be viewed as components of
an integrated information-based environmental strategy aimed at chang-
ing company behavior. Let us see how these instruments work by analyzing
an appropriate database at the company level.
8.4 The Database
Our database covers 476 CERs published worldwide from 1993 to 1997.
To carry out a meaningful empirical analysis, we selected a sample that
includes 39 big ﬁrms, based in 16 countries, belonging to three highly pol-
luting industries that produce comparable emissions (such as NOX and
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Fig. 8.2 Average quality of CERs (1992  100) worldwide, 1992–98
Source: ERM (1999).
Fig. 8.3 Percent of EMAS or ISO 14000-certiﬁed companies worldwide, 1994–97
Source: ERM (1999).SOX) using similar feedstocks: (1) petrochemicals, (2) oil and gas, and (3)
electric power generation (see appendix A) for the period 1993–97.
In addition to the CERs we gathered information on whether the com-
paniesadoptedanenvironmentalmanagementsystem(i.e.,ISO14000and/
or EMAS), adopted environmental compensation and award schemes, and
collected data on the main economic variables at the company level (this
was extracted from the standard annual reports).
Starting from this data, we built a panel that includes several variables:
(1) a standardized index of pollution; (2) measures of the size and eco-
nomic performance of the company; (3) an indicator of the quality, com-
prehensiveness, and transparency of the environmental information; (4) an
indicator of the adoption of one or more environmental audit, compensa-
tion, or award schemes; and (5) several control variables at the company,
industry, and country levels (see appendix A).
The panel is obviously aﬀected by a sample selection bias because it
includes only companies that voluntarily decided to publish CERs. Our
analysis, however, focuses on the eﬀects of more detailed instruments in
this population of relatively caring industries.2 In this case the sample-
selection critique does not apply because publishing a CER does not imply
the adoption of the environmental management tools we are considering.
The environmental performance variable (LPOLL) is deﬁned on an an-
nual basis as SOX plus NOX emissions per unit of output.3 The indicators
2. Although in this case, our sample has no sample selection bias, it is worth noticing that,
while data for environmental information accuracy are available for the whole period under
consideration (1993–97), for more recent tools such as the environmental audit, compensa-
tion, and award systems the sample includes many zeros in early years.
3. The output is expressed in tons of oil equivalent (TOE), which seems to be a suitable
measure in the three industries under review.
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Fig. 8.4 Percent of companies adopting compensation programs and award
schemes, worldwide, 1994–97
Source: ERM (1999).have been chosen on the basis of their impact on the environment and on
data availability. SOX is a main indicator used by the regulators as a base
for the environmental taxation system, and NOX plays a major role in land
acidiﬁcation. At this stage, we cannot consider data on waste and water
discharges because classiﬁcation across countries and regulations on waste
have signiﬁcantly changed over the last 5 years, and the currently available
data do not account for the damage associated with diﬀerent discharged
pollutants (a ﬁrm emitting a large quantity of a relatively harmless sub-
stance would be ranked as a larger polluter than another ﬁrm emitting a
small quantity of a very toxic substance).
The size of the company (WORK) is proxied by the number of employ-
ees, which also indicates the complexity of the agency problems in the
organization, while the economic performance (OPERATING INCOME)
is measured by the operating income in current U.S. dollars.4
The quality of the information disclosed in the environmental reports
(INFO) is measured by a scoring system, developed by the ERM at FEEM
(see appendix B). The system evaluates the descriptive information con-
tained in the report (i.e., mission, objectives, strategy, organization, and
programs), the quality of environmental variables and indicators (e.g.,
some reports contain data on emissions but omit economic data, such as
defensive and environmental expenditure, while others include indicators
but do not publish raw data for emissions, eﬄuents, and wastes), and the
thoroughness of the report (e.g., many reports cover a subset of sites or
ignore some foreign countries where the company operates).
Information-based environmental management is measured by a 0–3 in-
dex (environmental audit, award, and compensation; EAC), which is the
sum of three dummy variables: the ﬁrst (E) records the adoption of EMAS
and/or ISO 14000;5 the second (A) records the existence of an environ-
ment-related award system, which does not give immediate beneﬁts but
directly inﬂuences the future career of the managers and the employees;
and the third (C) records the adoption of an environment-related compen-
sation scheme.6 A more detailed description of the variables we use in our
analysis can be found in table 8.4, later.
We are well aware that both company variables and indicators are rather
4. We used companies’ annual reports to collect data on their operating income. Unfortu-
nately, most ﬁnancial statements are expressed only in local currency. In order to make them
comparable we decided to convert all ﬁnancial variables into current U.S. dollars by using
the nominal exchange rate of the local currency against the dollar.
5. Data on companies’ environmental management certiﬁcation were obtained from the
EMAS oﬃcial register and ISO 14000-competent body in each country.
6. To gain information about environmental compensation programs and award schemes
we relied on CERs and annual ﬁnancial reports and, for U.S. listed companies only, also on
oﬃcial disclosure required by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (reports such
as 10K for American companies quoted on the New York Stock Exchange and 20F for non-
American companies quoted on the New York Stock Exchange). If this information was
not available in corporate publications, we directly interviewed companies’ environmental
managers and external relation managers.
Environmental Information and Company Behavior 257raw and must be improved, but CERs have not been published for very
long and the data we can collect are quite limited. In addition to company
data, some control and regulation data have been collected at the coun-
try level.
8.5 A First Look at the Data
Do information-based environmental policies work? How do they in-
ﬂuence company behavior? Some preliminary answers to such questions
can be found by broadly comparing companies that adopted some infor-
mation-based environmental strategies (henceforth EAC companies) be-
tween 1993 and 1997 with companies that did not adopt such schemes.
At a ﬁrst glance, we observe that on average the companies that have
implemented compensation and award schemes and have certiﬁed envi-
ronmental management systems present better environmental perfor-
mances. A t-test performed on the mean shows that although the diﬀer-
ence is not signiﬁcant at the standard 5 percent or 10 percent levels (except
for 1997), EAC companies do perform better (table 8.1). Table 8.2 reports
the average pollution growth rates for EAC companies versus the whole
sample year by year. Once again, EAC companies are observed to perform
better, as their average pollution rate is lower than the one for the whole
sample for two out of the three years. When we consider average pollution
rates (see ﬁg. 8.5), we observe that EAC companies pollute much less than
the total sample; and they reduce pollution throughout the time span we
considered, while for the whole sample pollution drops from 1994 to 1996
but has an upward trend between 1996 and 1997.
To clarify this point we select three important case studies from among
the companies in our sample: BP Chemicals (petrochemicals); ELF (oil
Table 8.1 Average Pollution Rates
1994 1995 1996 1997
EAC  0 0.0038 0.0028 0.0036 0.0052
EAC  0 0.0014 0.0011 0.0009 0.0007
t-test 0.78 0.81 1.34 1.87
Table 8.2 Average Pollution Growth Rates
Average
1994–95 1995–96 1996–97 1994–97
Whole sample 0.39688 0.086121 0.068504 0.1618
EAC 0.20206 0.21496 0.14913 0.18921
Source: See appendix D.
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database and the scoring system, such companies were among the ﬁrst to
adopt EAC in their industries and to produce the highest quality CERs.
We look at their environmental performances considering their emissions
reduction rates before and after the EAC adoption. We also relate their
emissions to the quality of the environmental information produced to see
whether information quality and quantity are related to emissions re-
duction.
The analysis of emissions at BP Chemicals shows that the introduction
of environmental awards and compensation programs did inﬂuence the
pollution growth rate, which has been diminishing faster since the imple-
mentationofapioneeringawardschemein1994.Thenegativetrendinemis-
sions, after a slowdown in 1995, was strengthened by the introduction of a
certiﬁcation and compensation scheme in 1996 (see table 8.3 and ﬁg. 8.6).
ELF is an equally interesting case. The company sequentially intro-
duced an award scheme in 1995, and a certiﬁcation-compensation scheme
in 1996, constantly improving its environmental performance (see table
8.3 and ﬁg. 8.7). PowerGen adopted, in sequence, an environment-related
award scheme, a compensation mechanism, and ﬁnally a certiﬁcation sys-
tem. Its emissions constantly diminished at increasing rates, from 0.084
percent in 1993–94 to 0.136 percent in 1994–97 (see table 8.3 and ﬁg.
8.8). In these case studies, we can also observe a negative relationship
between the quality of corporate environmental information and the emis-
sions index. Figures 8.6, 8.7, and 8.8 illustrate these ﬁndings, highlighting
the year of adoption of the various management tools.
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Fig. 8.5 The impact of information-based environmental policies; EAC companies
vs. total sample in three selected industries worldwide, 1994–97
Note: See app. D; the average pollution has been calculated without considering the values
of two outlier companies.Table 8.3 Average Pollution Growth Rates, Case Studies
Average Growth Rate
Average Growth Rate, with EAC,
1993–94 1993–94
BP Chemical 0.1202683 0.0204621
ELF 0.1074995 0.1729896
PowerGen 0.0842359 0.1358968
Source: See appendix D.
Fig. 8.6 BP Chemicals: the impact of information-based environmental
policies, 1993–97
Fig. 8.7 ELF: the impact of information-based environmental policies, 1993–97These results seem to be consistent with two ideas: (1) the adoption of
information-based environmental tools improves company environmental
performance, and (2) such management instruments are complementary
with each other. Critics of information-based environmental strategies
could object that our ﬁndings are possibly spurious because the analysis
neglects standard environmental regulation, taxation, and several other
variables that may inﬂuence emissions together with EAC. To overcome
this objection, we carry out a statistical analysis that also includes other
policy variables, together with some control variables. For this purpose,
our panel is disturbingly small. But we believe that, at this stage, it is
worthwhile to present, with many caveats, some tentative results.
8.6 A Statistical Analysis
We perform a cross-country analysis for 16 countries, assuming that
governments adopt environmental policies based both on command and
control and on economic instruments; and that companies comply and
may also pursue tighter environmental strategies to avoid future risks and
liabilities. In this setting, we check whether environmental policies (com-
mand and control instruments and energy taxation) aﬀect the companies’
economic and environmental performance. We also check whether the
adoption of information-based environmental strategies (EAC) aﬀects this
relationship, inﬂuencing company behavior, given the energy tax burden
and the severity of environmental legislation.
It is generally acknowledged that environmental policy reduces pollu-
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Fig. 8.8 PowerGen: the impact of information-based environmental
policies, 1993–97tion, but harms economic performance. This trade-oﬀ,h o w e v e r ,c a nb e
eased by information-based environmental policies. We want to test
whether these policies, which aﬀect company behavior, can make compli-
a n c em o r ee ﬀective and less costly. The variables used in our estimates are
listed in table 8.4.
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We estimate the model using an instrumental variable (IV) procedure
because we cannot include all the variables simultaneously in our estima-
tion because of the endogeneity of the operating income with the depen-
dent variable. At ﬁrst we estimate the link between operating income (OP-
ERATING INCOME) and the existence of environmental certiﬁcation,
award, and compensation schemes (EAC), and the energy taxation burden
(TAX). We take into account the company dimension by using the number
of employees (WORK) as a control variable. Second, we relate the environ-
mental performance of companies (the logarithm of company pollution,
LPOLL) to the quality of environmental information at time t  1 (INFO)
to their economic performance (the instrumented operating income, IO-
PINC) and to the enforcement of legislation (ENFORCE). The results are
shown in table 8.5. As we expected, OPERATING INCOME is positively
related to EAC and to WORK (the company size). INFO (the quality of
environmental information) is nonsigniﬁcant.
Table 8.6 shows the results of the regression of the logarithm of com-
Table 8.4 Variables Used in Estimation
Variable Description
AWARD Dummy, which is 1 when an environmentally based award program is
implemented
CERTIFICATION Dummy, which is 1 when the company environmental management
system is certiﬁed for ISO 14000 and/or 1836/96 EMAS
COMPENSATION Dummy, which is 1 when an environmentally based compensation
p r o g r a ma tc o m p a n yl e v e li si m p l e m e n t e d
EAC Sum of CERTIFICATION, COMPENSATION, and AWARD (index
0–3)
ENFORCE Country index of environmental regulation enforcement
INFO Index, which ranges from 0 to 100, assessing the accuracy of company
environmental information
LPOLL Logarithm of company pollution, computed as SOX  NOX per TOE
OPERATING INCOME Annual operating income in current U.S. dollars
SECTOR Sectoral index, which is 1 for the electrical sector, 2 for oil and gas,
and 3 for chemicals
TAX Country index of burden energy taxes per GDP
WORK Number of employees per ﬁrm
262 D. Siniscalco, S. Borghini, M. Fantini, and F. Ranghieripany SOX plus NOX emissions (LPOLL) at time t on the instrumented
OPERATING INCOME at time t, on the quality of environmental infor-
mation (INFO) at time t  1, on the enforcement of legislation (EN-
FORCE), on the burden of energy taxation (TAX), and on the industry
dummy (SECTOR). LPOLL is negatively related to IOPINC (the IV op-
Table 8.6 Pollution (LPOLL)
Mean of dependent R2 .276393
variable 8.95649 Adjusted R2 .234806
Standard deviation LM heterogeneity
of dependent test .015806 [.942]
variable 3.49287 Durbin-Watson .022598 [.000, .000]
Sum of squared
residuals 812.667




Variable Coeﬃcient Error t-statistic p-value
IOPINC .186477E03 .108226E03 1.72303 * [.085]
INFO(1) .025010 .977345E02 2.55899 ** [.010]
ENFORCE .110039 .155892 .705866 [.480]
SECTOR 2.61997 .911784 2.87345 ** [.004]
TAX .818044 .967608 .845429 [.398]
C 9.18296 3.70121 2.48107 ** [.013]
Hausman test of H0:RE vs. FE: CHISQ(2)  5.2067, p-value  [.0740]
Table 8.5 Operating Income
Mean of dependent R2 .421142
variable 1,889.92 Adjusted R2 .404116
Standard deviation LM heterogeneity
of dependent test 17.1105 [.000]
variable 2,489.03 Durbin-Watson .075581 [.000, .000]
Sum of squared
residuals .381484E09




Variable Coeﬃcient Error t-statistic p-value
EAC 413.964 81.1986 5.09818 ** [.000]
WORK .050996 .948368E02 5.37726 ** [.000]
INFO (1) 6.01047 9.13842 .657715 [.511]
C 77.6047 766.808 .101205 [.919]
Hausman test of H0:RE vs. FE: CHISQ(3)  29.548, p-value  [.0000]
Environmental Information and Company Behavior 263erating income), which is consistent with the idea that the adoption of
EAC reduces emissions. Moreover, INFO (the quality of environmental
information) is negatively related with LPOLL, suggesting that manag-
ers’ and employees’ eﬀorts on environmental matters are signiﬁcantly in-
ﬂuenced not only by the presence of EAC but also by the accuracy of en-
vironmental information. SECTOR is positively related with LPOLL,
simply reﬂecting the structural and technological characteristics of pro-
duction in the three industries under review. Finally, the relation between
ENFORCE and LPOLL is negative, but not signiﬁcant (p  0.480).
8.7 Concluding Remarks
Information-based environmental strategies play a signiﬁcant role in our
sample. Given environmental regulation, which is costly, they positively
inﬂuence operating income and negatively inﬂuence pollution. Being pri-
marily implementation tools, they cannot substitute for more traditional
policies, but can play a useful role.
Our ﬁndings are consistent with a whole class of models on environmen-
tal information, incentives, and company behavior. In our panel data esti-
mation, the accuracy of environmental information is negatively related
with pollution and the relation is signiﬁcant. That is, information quality
is crucial for companies’ environmental management and there are expla-
nations for corporate noncompliance that are not related to the level of the
penalties, but instead to the company’s scarcity of internal information
(Brehn and Hamilton 1996).
In contrast from our results we cannot infer the role of environmental
information accuracy on ﬁnancial performance. In our analysis, we used
operating income as a proxy of companies’ ﬁnancial health since we
wanted to investigate the existing relation between environmental manage-
ment tools and company results in the short period. Existing literature on
environmental information and corporate ﬁnancial performances ﬁnds a
signiﬁcant relationship between these variables, but it refers to external
environmental information (information provided to external stakehold-
ers) and to long-term performances such as shareholder value or liabilities
(Tietenberg 1997; Lanoi, Laplant, and Roy, 1997; Khanna and Damon
1999). These diﬀerences help in understanding the diﬀerences between our
analysis and prior analyses.
However, generic pleas for better and wider “environmental informa-
tion” or “eco-management” are too vague and may be misleading. In order
to exert a positive inﬂuence, environmental information needs to be in-
tegrated with a set of incentives, as recommended by economic theory
for any company objective. This explains the nature of many integrated en-
vironmental and management schemes (such as ISO 14000 or EMAS)
adopted by ﬁrms and recommended by policymakers. Our empirical
264 D. Siniscalco, S. Borghini, M. Fantini, and F. Ranghierimodel conﬁrms the positive role of self-regulated environmental audits
and compensation programs on corporate environmental performance,
and this is consistent with an emerging research ﬁeld that explores the
possible patterns for integrating environmental issues with concrete man-
agement systems (Sinclair-Desgagne ´ and Gabel 1997; Pfaﬀ and Sanchir-
ico 1999).
These conclusions, of course, are just tentative, given the preliminary
nature of our empirical analysis. In order to reach more robust conclu-
sions, better data must be collected and better estimates must be carried
out. But the preliminary results we have obtained so far seem to be consis-
tent with economic theory and with common sense.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Forum on Environmental Reporting Guidelines
In order to guarantee a minimum standard of CERs as a voluntary docu-
ment, FEEM organized in 1994 the Forum on Environmental Reporting
(FER) by inviting some large companies emerging in the ﬁeld of environ-
mental management and reporting, and some interested target groups for
environmental reports, environmental groups, and public administration,
to work together to draw up guidelines. The aim of the FER is to set
guidelines for companies seeking to produce an eﬀective environmental
report, providing stakeholders with the information needed from other
similar initiatives for a consensus approach. Here follows the list of mini-
mum and recommended requirements to be included in CERs. These re-
quirements have been used as the basis for the ERM scoring system, aimed
at evaluating the quality of environmental information.
Table 8B.1 Qualitative Information (Notes to the Environmental Balance Sheet)
1. Company description
a. Company size and activities Minimum requirement
b. Number and location of production sites Minimum requirement
c. General description of production processes Minimum requirement
d. Description of the main environmental issues Minimum requirement
related to production and distribution
2. Environmental policy
a. Year of introduction of environmental policy and Minimum requirement
content
b. Expected achievements Minimum requirement
c. Achievements monitoring (comparison with Minimum requirement
prevous reported objectives)
3. Environmental management systems
a. Organization structure (environmental department Minimum requirement
and relationships with other business units)
b. Programs for environmental policy implementation Minimum requirement
c. Training activity Recommended requirement
d. Implementation level of environmental Recommended requirement
management system and certiﬁcations (EMAS,
ISO, or UNI [Ente Italiano per l’Uniﬁcazione])
4. Risk management
a. Audits, mesaures taken, and achievements Recommended requirement
regarding risk management
b. Description of cleanup operations carried out Recommended requirement
c. Description of major accidents Recommended requirement
5. Compliance with environmental legislation
a. Description of the way the company ensures Recommended requirement
compliance with environmental regulations (in
relation to previous violations as well as to
prevention measures)
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b. Description of measures adopted to comply with Recommended requirement
new environmental regulations (EU, national, and
local) that became operational during the period to
which the report refers
6. Product policy
a. Description of product’s life cycle and of the Recommended requirement
related impacts and description of the most
relevant measures to mitigate them
b. Product innovation Recommended requirement
c. Product’s energy eﬃciency (when relevant) Recommended requirement
d. Company responsibility at the end of product use Recommended requirement
e. Cooperation programs with consumers and clients Recommended requirement
f. Ecolabel (where applicable) Recommended requirement
7. Conservation of natural resources
a. Energy-saving programs Minimum requirement
b. Water-saving programs Minimum requirement
c. Other programs for the protection of natural Recommended requirement
heritage
8. Stakeholders’ relations
a. Participation in voluntary agreement schemes Recommended requirement
b. Relations with stakeholders (public administration, Recommended requirement
environmentalists, universities, etc.)
c. Department or name of the person to contact for Minimum requirement
further information
9. Certiﬁcation
a. External certiﬁcation Recommended requirement
b. Certiﬁcation by EMAS-accredited veriﬁers Recommended requirement
Table 8B.2 Quantitative Information (the Environmental Balance Sheet)
1. Environmental expenditures
a. Data on environmental expenditures Recommended requirement
b. Explanation of accounting criteria Minimum requirements
2. Emissions and consumption of raw materials
a. Site-by-site quantitative information (for main Minimum requirement
sites)
b. Raw materials Recommended requirement
c. Energy as input Minimum requirement
d. Wastes, air emissions, water discharges, soil Minimum requirement
pollution, and other pollutants relevant to
company’s activity
e. Quantity of products or a relevant ﬁgure to Minimum requirement
describe production level
f. Impacts (scientiﬁcally accounted) related to Recommended requirement
production activity
g. Reduction objects for raw materials, energy, Recommended requirement
pollutants, and impacts
3. Environmental performance indicators
a. Environmental performance indicators compared Minimum requirement
with previous periods
Source: FER (1995).Appendix C
Environmental Reporting Monitor (ERM)
Starting from the Forum on Environmental Reporting (FER) guidelines
the FEEM has set up an Environmental Reporting Monitor (ERM) deﬁn-
ing a three-section checklist as a scoring system. The ﬁrst two sections
represent of the two parts of the report: the ﬁrst section checks for the
qualitative information, the second one for the quantitative information,
following the FER requirements (see FER 1995, app. 3); the third one is
the comments section, explained here. The structure of the checklist is
as follows:
● Qualitative section: It veriﬁes that four minimum requirements and
eleven recommended requirements are met. The score—the report
can receive from 0 to 2 points for every minimum requirement met
and from 0 to 1 for every recommended requirement met.
● Quantitative section: It veriﬁes that nine minimum requirements and
ﬁve recommended requirements are respected. The score—the report
can receive from 0 to 2 points for every minimum requirement re-
spected and from 0 to 1 for every recommended requirement re-
spected.
● Comment: First, it checks that the CER structure complies with the
FER guidelines. Then, it checks whether the report is complete. The
score for data quantity—if it is exhaustive it receives 2 points, if me-
dium 1 point, if it is not enough 0 points. The score for data quality—
whether the CER refers to a sample, whether the report maker used
a speciﬁc methodology for CER data collection, and whether an audit
has been implemented to check the data from 0 to 2 points. Then it
checks report legibility (from 0 to 2 points), and it veriﬁes whether
the report gives other information and whether there is a positive evo-
lution in act from the last reports to the present one (if yes, 1 point).
Each CER can receive up to 19 points in the qualitative section, 23 points
in the quantitative section, and 16 points in the comments section. The
maximum score is 58 points. For this paper, each score has been nor-
malized.
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Comment Kevin Hassett
It is all too often the case in economics that researchers spend far more
time devising elaborate methods to tease answers from existing data sets
than they do performing the heavy lifting required to develop new data
sources. This paper is a refreshing contrast. The authors have built a fasci-
nating database that will be an invaluable resource to future researchers,
who will likely be able to shed new light on a number of interesting ques-
tions with these new data.
When I teach econometrics to graduate students, I always try to empha-
size the potentially large beneﬁts from developing new data: One can often
learn a great deal with a simple inspection of sample means. If I have a
criticism of this paper, it is that the authors have taken this point a little
Kevin Hassett is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.
278 D. Siniscalco, S. Borghini, M. Fantini, and F. Ranghieribit too literally. After developing their new data, they seem to have run
out of gas, providing only a cursory set of simple regressions that are very
poorly documented. Clearly, much work is left to be done, and readers
might better spend their time staring at the individual observations pre-
sented in the appendixes than reading the empirical section carefully.
Now for the details. Many economists have long feared that managers
have little incentive to worry too much about how much pollution their
ﬁrm produces. Cutting back pollution is costly, and since managers’ com-
pensation depends on near-term proﬁts, there is little incentive to be too
aggressive. Costs from pollution are often long term, and the manager will
be ﬂoating on his yacht in the Mediterranean by the time the ﬁrm has to
pay for the damages its pollution has caused.
Regulators, and to some extent ﬁrms, have recognized this problem,
and a number of complementary approaches have been adopted to over-
come it. Recognizing that shining a light on pollution as it occurs might
increase incentives to internalize long-run costs, the European Commis-
sion adopted the EMAS (Eco Management Audit Scheme), which recom-
mends a method for evaluating the environmental performance of a ﬁrm.
In addition, many ﬁrms have begun to increase executive compensation
when particular environmental targets are met by management. The ques-
tion is, are these measures eﬀective? Does pollution go down when the
policies are adopted?
Ex ante, there is no reason to believe that they would be eﬀective. Infor-
mation concerning eﬄuents that is supplied voluntarily might be very un-
reliable. Managers may enjoy receiving bonuses for green behavior, but the
monetary rewards of high proﬁts are signiﬁcant, and one might expect
them to dwarf the bonuses associated with environmental performance.
To address the question, the authors constructed a database from ﬁrm
environmental reports published from 1993 to 1997. They selected a
sample that includes all the companies belonging to three polluting indus-
tries: petrochemicals, oil and gas, and electric power generation. The ﬁnal
sample consists of 39 ﬁrms based in 16 countries. The authors ﬁrst show
that ﬁrms that adopt reward schemes have slightly better environmental
performance, although the diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant. Pollu-
tion decreases over time faster for ﬁrms that have incentive programs as
well, but again the evidence is fairly weak.
The authors then perform a statistical analysis that proceeds in two
steps. They show that operating income is higher for ﬁrms that have envi-
ronmental compensation programs, and then show that pollution is lower
for ﬁrms that have better environmental reports.
It is at the estimation stage that the work starts to have problems. It is
not clear to me what the authors are attempting to establish by running a
regression with a limited number of variables to predict operating income.
None of the variables is scaled or, as far as I can tell, deﬂated, so that
Environmental Information and Company Behavior 279strong trends in the data (or swings in exchange rates) could be determin-
ing the results. A sign that trouble is afoot is the Durbin-Watson, which is
very close to zero. With very strong trends in the data, there is almost
certainly a spurious regression problem, and the t-statistics are essentially
meaningless. So do these programs aﬀect environmental performance?
Should governments everywhere start to require better environmental au-
dits and green compensation packages? It is impossible to say given what
has been done here because the empirical work is incomplete.
A more thorough empirical analysis of the data here will be quite prom-
ising. A good place to start would be to perform some simple diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerence comparisons that build on the work presented in table 8.2.
Clever use of this technique should overcome the biggest empirical prob-
lem here: Firms that adopt programs might have a strong taste for environ-
mental reform, and this unobserved heterogeneity might make it look like
the program is eﬀective, when in fact the program is only a signal of the
ﬁrm’s underlying preferences toward pollution.
Despite these criticisms, I enjoyed the paper very much. The authors
have provided the profession an invaluable service in constructing the data
set (and carefully describing the programs), and they should be com-
mended for printing the entire data set in the appendixes.
280 D. Siniscalco, S. Borghini, M. Fantini, and F. Ranghieri